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Abstract—The problem of quality of service (QoS) and jamming-
aware communications is considered in an adversarial wireless
network subject to external eavesdropping and jamming attacks.
To ensure robust communication against jamming, an interference-
aware routing protocol is developed that allows nodes to avoid com-
munication holes created by jamming attacks. Then, a distributed
cooperation framework, based on deep reinforcement learning,
is proposed that allows nodes to assess network conditions and
make deep learning-driven, distributed, and real-time decisions
on whether to participate in data communications, defend the
network against jamming and eavesdropping attacks, or jam
other transmissions. The objective is to maximize the network
performance that incorporates throughput, energy efficiency, delay,
and security metrics. Simulation results show that the proposed
jamming-aware routing approach is robust against jamming and
when throughput is prioritized, the proposed deep reinforcement
learning approach can achieve significant (measured as three-fold)
increase in throughput, compared to a benchmark policy with fixed
roles assigned to nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congested and contested environments in wireless networks
are characterized by intermittent connectivity due to severe
interference conditions including jamming. In addition, adver-
saries may attempt to eavesdrop on the ongoing transmissions as
a stealth attack. Wireless nodes are typically limited by different
levels of resources such as energy (e.g., battery), computation
(e.g., processing power and memory), and communication re-
sources (e.g., bandwidth). Therefore, effective coordination and
cooperation among network nodes is necessary to manage infor-
mation flows and satisfy the requirements of communications
subject to adversarial effects (jamming and eavesdropping) and
resource limitations.
The problem of secure routing with quality of service
(QoS) considerations has attracted recent attention in adversarial
network settings. A wireless communication network in the
presence of eavesdroppers is considered in [1] and a centralized
approach is proposed to construct a routing path that maximizes
the system performance, in terms of the secrecy outage proba-
bility. An ant colony optimization algorithm is proposed in [2]
to determine the optimal routing path that ensures the desired
security and QoS requirements. These solutions are centralized
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and do not necessarily respond effectively to changes in the
network.
To adapt to network dynamics, reinforcement learning has
emerged as a viable solution for distributed network optimiza-
tion. Reinforcement learning allows nodes acting as agents to
select their decisions based on the rewards received from the
environment and to adapt their decisions in real time to the
changes in the environment. Reinforcement learning has been
applied to develop distributed resource allocation and routing
algorithms in wireless networks [3]–[6]. The main drawback
of conventional reinforcement learning algorithms is that the
computational overhead involving maintenance of the Q-table
grows significantly with the state and action space [7], which
limits their practicality.
More recently, deep reinforcement learning has been pro-
posed to reduce the computational burden of conventional rein-
forcement learning, leading to a more practical implementation.
Deep reinforcement learning relies on deep neural networks
to determine the optimal decisions for a given state of the
environment, and thus, its computational complexity is less
compared to conventional reinforcement learning. A QoS-aware
routing protocol based on deep reinforcement learning is pro-
posed in [10] that determines, based on the traffic demands, the
routing paths that maximize the number of flows with satisfied
QoS requirements. Jamming is a major security concern for
performance loss in wireless networks [11], and deep learning
has been shown to be effective in both launching and defending
against jamming attacks [12], [13]. An anti-jamming policy
using deep reinforcement learning is developed in [14] that ex-
ploits mobility and spread spectrum, and allows a mobile user to
escape an area of heavy jamming. The underlying reinforcement
learning algorithm determines a global optimal path. Hence, the
decision is not individually performed by nodes in a distributed
fashion. This raises the need to design a distributed solution that
achieves the desired network performance and is simultaneously
robust to both jamming and eavesdropping attacks.
In this paper, we present a distributed adaptive framework for
cooperation and coordination in an adversarial wireless network
environment that consists of blue-force and red-force nodes.
Network communications and security tasks share resources and
it is beneficial to design and perform these tasks jointly [15]. We
assume that blue-force nodes aim to maximize their throughput
in the presence of jamming from red-force nodes, prevent red-
force nodes from eavesdropping their transmissions, or jam
red-force transmissions when they detect red-force signals. The
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contributions of the paper are summarized below:
• We consider a novel distributed approach that allows nodes
to assess the current network conditions in terms of the
received signal strength, queue length, location, and mes-
sages, dynamically adjust their roles, and decide whether to
participate in communication or defend the network against
attacks or attack other (out-of-network) nodes.
• We design distance-vector based interference-aware dis-
tributed routing protocols (one jamming-avoiding, and the
other jamming-aware) that allow nodes to construct a rout-
ing path to avoid communication holes due to jamming.
The proposed routing protocols rely at most on two-hop
information to make routing decisions. Thus, they do not
incur significant communication overhead.
• We develop a deep reinforcement learning solution for
nodes to decide on whether to participate in communi-
cation, defend the network, or attack other transmissions
for the sake of optimizing the desired performance metric,
which jointly captures throughput, energy efficiency, delay,
and security aspects. Nodes decide on one of five roles,
namely transmitter, receiver, cooperative jammer (jamming
red-force eavesdropping nodes so that they cannot decode
blue-force transmissions), adversarial jammer (jamming
blue-force data transmissions), or waiting.
• Simulation results demonstrate the robustness of the pro-
posed jamming-aware routing protocol and show that our
proposed deep reinforcement learning approach achieves
a three-fold increase in throughput, compared to a bench-
mark policy that assumes fixed roles for nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model. Section III presents deep rein-
forcement learning approach. Section IV reports the simulation
results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a wireless network of N blue-force nodes, N , that
are uniformly deployed over a disk of radius R and move
according to the Brownian motion mobility model [8]. Nodes
communicate with each other using carrier sense multiple ac-
cess/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) medium access protocol.
In the network, F communication flows are present and the
pair (si, di) corresponds to the source/destination pair of the
ith communication flow. To deliver packets from each source
to its destination, link state geometric routing is employed in
which each node chooses, among its neighbors (nodes within its
communication range r), the next hop node with the minimum
distance to the destination. Distance will be defined later in this
section. Each node maintains a queue for the packets received
from each communication flow and a routing table that stores
the next hop for each flow and the minimum distance to its
destination. Thus, given the presence of packets pertaining to
multiple flows, each node i selects, at any time, the flow and
the next hop to minimize the distance to the destination D, i.e.,
j∗ = arg min
j∈Ni
dij + djD , (1)
Fig. 1: Left – minimum (geographic) distance routing, right –
jamming-avoiding geometric routing.
where dij is the distance between node i and j and Ni is the
set of neighbors of node i.
Red-force nodes are uniformly distributed at the boundary of
the network and seek to attack the communication of blue-force
nodes. In particular, among red-force nodes, MCJ nodes choose
to eavesdrop communications of blue-force nodes, MAJ nodes
perform adversarial jamming, and MT nodes are engaged in
their own communications. Due to jamming, communication
holes occur in the network, which will considerably reduce
the network throughput through its impact on network-level
communications. At the network level, when the next hop is
jammed in conventional geometric routing, the transmitter is
not aware of the status of the next hop and keeps sending
packets indefinitely to the same next hop. As a consequence,
packets will never arrive to its destination, and throughput
will significantly be degraded. We consider two interference-
aware enhancements to the conventional geometric routing in
the following subsection.
A. Enhanced Geometric Routing Protocols
The first enhanced routing protocol is the jamming-avoiding
geometric routing in which a jammed node broadcasts its status
to its immediate neighbors. To detect adversarial jamming, blue-
force nodes sense the spectrum. If the received signal strength
is higher than a certain threshold, the node considers itself
jammed. Then its neighbors set the distance of the jammed
node to the destinations to infinity, and the routing tables are
updated accordingly. The second enhanced protocol, termed the
adaptive, jamming-aware geometric routing protocol, aims at
constructing the minimum distance path to the destination such
that it avoids the jammed area. This routing protocol requires
two-hop network information, namely each transmitter i obtains
information not only about its neighbors but the neighbors of
its neighbors. This information includes the jamming status
of each node and its distance to its destination. Transmitter
i then computes, for each unjammed neighbor j, the angle
θijj′ between i, j, and the next hop j′ from j. The cost is
the Euclidean distance between transmitter i and next node j
divided by θijj′ . Then transmitter i chooses as the next hop,
the unjammed neighbor j∗ with the minimum cost, i.e.,
j∗ = arg min
j∈Ni
dij
θijj′
+ djD . (2)
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the two routing protocols.
Fig. 2: Adaptive, jamming-aware geometric routing.
B. Role Selection for QoS-aware and Secure Communications
To ensure successful packet delivery while keeping transmis-
sions as secure as possible from red-force nodes, each blue-force
node uses local information such as received signal strength,
neighbor information, queue length, and distance to destination,
and chooses at each time instant to perform one of the following
actions: 1) transmit a packet, 2) receive a packet, 3) cooperative
jamming to mitigate eavesdropping attacks [16], 4) adversarial
jamming to jam red-force nodes, or 5) wait. The objective is
to determine the optimal action of nodes that maximizes the
network utility within duration T . Nodes choose their actions
according to a(t) = (ai(t))i∈N , where ai(t) corresponds to
the action taken by node i at time t. Network utility consists of
three rewards and two costs. Reward NT (a(t)) for throughput
is the number of successfully delivered packets at time t,
reward NCJ(a(t)) for cooperative jamming is the expected
number of failed eavesdropping attempts normalized by the
total number of eavesdropping attempts at time t, and reward
NAJ(a(t)) for adversarial jamming is the expected proportion
of jammed red-force nodes at time t. At time t, cost NE(a(t))
is the energy consumed and cost ND(a(t)) for delay is the
expectation of time when a node with non-empty queue decides
to wait. The average over time for each metric is given by
N¯k([a]
T
1 ) =
1
T
∑T
t=1Nk(a(t)), where k ∈ {T,CJ,AJ,D,E}
and [a]T1 = (a(1),a(2), ...,a(T )).
The overall optimization problem is given by
max
[a]T1
∑
k∈{KR}
wkN¯k([a]
T
1 )−
∑
k∈{KC}
wkN¯k([a]
T
1 ), (3)
where reward types are KR = {T,CJ,AJ}, cost types are
KC = {E,D}, and weight wk is the respective weight of the
individual metric N¯k. To solve (3), distributed reinforcement
learning is employed next.
III. DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR QOS-AWARE
AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
A. States, Actions, Rewards, and Costs
To solve (3) with reinforcement learning, each node ob-
serves its state si(t) based on the messages received from
its neighbors, performs an action ai(t), and receives a re-
ward in return. The state si(t) of each node i is si(t) =
(s1i (t), s
2
i (t), s
3
i (t), s
4
i (t), s
5
i (t), s
6
i (t), s
7
i (t)), where
• s1i (t): Node i’s queue length.
• s2i (t): The indicator if ready to send (RTS) message
intended to node i is received.
• s3i (t): The indicator if RTS not intended to node i is
received.
• s4i (t): The indicator if clear to send (CTS) message in-
tended to node i is received.
• s5i (t): The indicator if CTS not intended to node i is
received.
• s6i (t): The indicator if node i sent RTS.
• s7i (t): The indicator if node i sent CTS.
• s8i (t): Number of time slots elapsed since an RTS is sent.
• s9i (t): Number of time slots elapsed for backoff, and
• s10i (t): Number of time slots elapsed waiting for data.
The action taken by each node is either Transmit (T), Receive
(R), Cooperative Jamming (CJ), Adversarial Jamming (AJ), or
Wait (W). Rewards associated for each action ai(t) given state
si(t) are described below.
Transmit (T): When node i decides to transmit, the reward
is
ri(ai(t), si(t)) = I(SINR > τ)×wT×(1−I(CTS(j, k))), (4)
where I(SINR > τ) is the indicator that the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) is greater than the required
threshold τ , which also indicates a successful packet delivery;
wT is the weighing factor of throughput; and I(CTS(j, k)) is
the indicator that node i received CTS which is not intended to
it (CTS sent from node j to k), which indicates a transmission
collision.
The cost of transmitting is the energy spent per time slot.
In the considered scenario, all nodes transmit with fixed power.
Therefore, one unit of energy is consumed by each node in each
time slot, and the cost is given by ci(ai(t), si(t)) = wE , where
wE is the weighing factor of energy consumption.
Receive (R): When node i decides to receive, the reward is
ri(ai(t), si(t)) = I(SINR > τ)× wT × I(RTS(i, k)), (5)
where I(RTS(i, k)) indicates that node i received an RTS
intended to itself.
The cost of receiving is the delay incurred on the pack-
ets stored in the node’s queue. In particular, it is given by
ci(ai(t), si(t)) = I(q > 0) × wD, where I(q > 0) is the
indicator that node i’s queue length q is positive; and wD is
the weighing factor of delay.
Cooperative jamming (CJ): When node i chooses to be a
cooperative jammer, the reward is given by the proportion of
failed eavesdropping attempts. In particular, the reward is
ri(ai(t), si(t)) = NE × wCJ × I(RTS(j, k)), (6)
where NE is the average proportion of eavesdroppers within the
transmitter’s range and the cooperative jammer range, which
is given by the length of arc formed by the intersection of
the network border, the reception area, and the jammed area
divided by the length of arc formed by the intersection of the
network border and the reception area (note that the transmis-
sion reception area is approximated by a disk centered at the
transmitter for computational tractability); wCJ is the weighing
factor of cooperative jamming; and I(RTS(j, k)) is the indicator
that node i received an RTS not intended to it, which indicates
that node i sensed an existing blue-force transmission.
The cost of cooperative jamming is the energy spent due to
jamming and the incurred delay on node i’s packets. Thus, the
cost is given by
ci(ai(t), si(t)) = wE + I(q > 0)× wD. (7)
Adversarial jamming (AJ): When node i acts as an adversarial
jammer, the reward is computed by the proportion of jammed
red-force receivers. Therefore, the reward is given by
ri(ai(t), si(t)) = NAJ × wAJ × Iadv, (8)
where NAJ is the average proportion of red-force receivers in
the jamming range (since the red-force nodes are uniformly
distributed over the network border, the proportion NAJ is given
by the length of arc formed by the intersection of the network
border and the jammed area, divided by 2piRmax, where Rmax
is the radius of the network area); wAJ is the weighing factor
of adversarial jamming; and Iadv is the indicator of sensed red-
force transmission.
The cost of adversarial jamming is the energy spent due to
jamming and the incurred delay on node i’s packets. Thus, the
cost is given by (7).
Wait (W): Node i chooses to wait when there is no benefit
of performing any of other actions. i.e., when their utilities are
negative. Thus, the utility of waiting is set to zero.
Reinforcement Q-learning is adopted by approximating the
value Q function for a given state and action based on the utility
p(si(t), ai(t)) of the current time slot t according to:
Qnew(si(t), ai(t)) = (1− α)Q(si(t), ai(t)) + α(p(si(t), ai(t))
+γmax
b
Q(si(t+ 1), b), (9)
where α is the learning rate, γ is the discount factor, and
p(si(t), ai(t)) is the immediate utility. The pseudocode of the
Q-learning algorithm is given by Algorithm 1. The drawback
of conventional reinforcement learning approaches is that the
magnitude of Q-value evaluations grows exponentially with
the state and action space. Thus, we consider an alternative
approach, using deep learning, to approximate the Q value.
B. Deep Q-learning
A deep Q-Network (DQN) is implemented to teach each node
which action to perform given observations [9]. In particular the
actor-critic DQN algorithm is implemented. In the actor-critic
DQN implementation, there are two deep neural networks with
the same architecture but different parameters. The first network
is the actor network that determines the optimal policy for a
given current state. The second network is the critic network
that evaluates the goodness of the chosen policy by the actor.
The input of both the actor and the critic networks is the current
state. The critic network generates an approximate value that
will be used to approximate the Q value for a given state and
action. The output of the actor network is an approximate policy
that is the probability distribution piθ(si(t), at) of the action
values for a given state si(t).
Algorithm 1: Q-learning algorithm
1 Initialize action-value function Q;
2 for t=1,...,T do
3 while at least one flow l has not reached to its destination,
do
4 for all nodes i ∈ N do
1) Observes its state and acquires states of
other nodes from local messages to form
observation vector si(t)
2) Selects action
ai(t) = argmaxai(t)∈AQ(si(t), ai(t))
with probability (w.p.) 1−  or a random
action ai(t) ∈ A w.p. 
3) Executes an action ai(t)
4) Receives reward Ri(si(t), ai(t))
5) Broadcasts its action ai(t) to its neighbors.
5 end
6 end
7 end
Since the actor and critic networks are two different networks,
two distinct set of weights will be used to train each network.
We denote by θ and w, the set of weights for the actor and critic,
respectively. The critic network is trained (i.e., the weights are
updated) such that the loss function L(w) is minimized. L(w) is
the squared error between the target value and the approximate
value generated by the critic network, i.e.,
L(w) = (p(si(t), at)
+γmax
a
Qw(si(t+ 1), a)−Qw(si(t), a(t)))2,(10)
where Qw(s, a) is the approximate Q value generated by the
critic network. The weights of the actor, on the other hand, are
updated according to a policy gradient. Thus, the weights of the
actor and the critic are updated, respectively as:
• Policy Update for actor:
∆θ = α∇θ log piθ(si(t), a(t))Qw(si(t), a(t)). (11)
• Value Update for critic:
∆w = (p(si(t), at) + γmax
a
Qw(si(t+ 1), a)
−Qw(si(t), a))∇wQw(si(t), a(t)), (12)
where α and β are the learning rates of the actor and critic
network, respectively. To reduce the training time and increase
the convergence, experience replay is used in which an agent
stores its experience into a memory and pools over many
episodes into a replay memory. This enables to reduce the
effects of correlated training data. The replay memory buffer
also helps improve stability by regularizing the policy. The
pseudocode for the DQN algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Interference-aware routing results
For network simulations written in Matlab, we consider
the following network settings. Number of blue force nodes
is 40, number of red-force nodes is 10 (MCJ is 3, MAJ
is 3, and MT is 4), network radius R is 10 km, speed of
Brownian motion is 1 m/s. Transmit power of each node is 1 W.
Channel model follows free space propagation with log-normal
Algorithm 2: Deep Q-learning algorithm
1 Initialize replay memory M with capacity C;
2 Initialize action-value function Q with random weights;
3 for episode=1,...,M do
4 while at least one flow l has not reached to its destination,
do
5 for all nodes i ∈ N (in parallel) do
1) Observes its state and acquires states of other
nodes from local messages to form observation
vector si(t)
2) Selects action
ai(t) = argmaxai(t)∈AQ(si(t), ai(t))
w.p. 1−  or a random action ai(t) ∈ A w.p. 
3) Executes an action ai(t)
4) Receives reward Ri(si(t), ai(t))
5) Broadcasts its action ai(t) to its neighbors.
6) Stores transition in replay memory M
7) Performs weight updates
6 end
7 end
8 end
shadowing. SINR threshold τ is 5 dB. We simulated three rout-
ing protocols, namely minimum (geographic) distance routing,
jamming-avoiding geometric routing and adaptive, jamming-
aware geometric routing. Minimum distance routing is the
baseline protocol that does not incorporate node jamming status
as a routing metric; as a result, it is expected that it provides the
worst performance results. Each simulation is run for 15, 000
time slots. To assess the robustness of the proposed routing
protocols, jamming by the red-force nodes is activated after the
first 5,000 time slots. The same scenario is run for all routing
protocols by fixing the seed of random number generator in each
experiment. The simulation is repeated 30 times with different
seeds to determine the confidence intervals on the results.
We measured the following metrics, the average end-to-end
throughput, the proportion of failed eavesdropping attempts,
and the proportion of jammed red-force nodes. Figure 3 shows
the average network throughput over time. The shaded areas
represent the 99% confidence intervals of the average through-
put of each of the studied protocols. As shown in Figure
3, the average throughput of the jamming-avoiding routing
protocol and the adaptive, jamming-aware routing protocols
does not reduce with time. Thus, the jamming-avoiding routing
protocol and the adaptive, jamming-aware routing protocols are
robust to red-force jamming. Figure 3 also shows that, for
the considered simulation scenario, adaptive, jamming-avoiding
protocol achieves the highest average throughput.
Figure 4 shows the average proportion of jammed red-
force nodes over time. When red-force jamming starts, the
jamming-avoiding routing protocol has higher proportion of
jammed red-force nodes than the conventional minimum dis-
tance routing protocol does, whereas proportion of jammed
red-force nodes using adaptive, jamming-aware routing is only
5% compared to the conventional geometric routing, which
shows that jamming/interference-aware routing protocols im-
prove throughput while not significantly deteriorating security.
Figure 5 shows the average proportion of failed eaves-
Fig. 3: Average network throughput versus time for the three
routing algorithms.
Fig. 4: Average proportion of jammed red-force nodes versus
time for the three routing algorithms.
dropping attempts over time for the three considered routing
protocols. When red-force jamming is initiated, the jamming-
avoiding routing protocol has higher proportion of failed eaves-
dropping attempts than the conventional minimum distance rout-
ing protocol does, whereas the proportion of failed eavesdrop-
ping attempts using adaptive, jamming-aware routing protocol is
only 4% lower than the conventional geometric protocol, which
shows that it improves throughput without jeopardizing security.
B. Deep reinforcement learning results
Adaptive, jamming-aware geometric routing is used as the
routing protocol. The actor and critic networks are developed
as feedforward neural networks (FNNs), each with two hidden
layers. The ReLU function is used as the activation function.
We set the episode size to be 8, the batch size to be 2, and
the memory capacity C to be 10000. For better performance,
we transform the input into a one-hot input vector. As for
exploration, we set the value of epsilon to be 1 for the first
500 time slots, and then to 0.2 for the next 300 time slots, and,
afterwards, it is set to 0.01 until the end of the simulations.
The weights of the immediate payoffs are wT = 15, wAJ =
3, wCJ = 5, wE = 3, and wD = 1 (namely, throughput is
prioritized). We compute the average throughput achieved using
the deep Q-learning algorithm and the baseline in which nodes
have fixed communication or security roles. Figure 6 shows
the average throughput achieved for the considered cases over
time. When the deep Q-learning algorithm is used, the average
throughput increases with time until it stabilizes around 3, 000
time slots. As shown in Figure 6, the proposed deep Q-learning
approach can achieve considerable gain, in terms of throughput,
Fig. 5: Average proportion of failed eavesdropping attempts
versus time for the three routing algorithms.
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Fig. 6: Average throughput versus time using deep Q-learning.
compared to the case when the communication and red-force
nodes assume fixed roles.
Figure 7 shows the average proportion of jammed red-force
nodes over time. Using Q-learning, the average proportion of
jammed red-force nodes decreases with time because weighing
factors are set to prioritize throughput, which causes the average
proportion of jammed red-force nodes to decrease as nodes learn
correctly their roles using deep Q-learning. Similarly, Figure
8 shows that the average proportion of failed eavesdropping
attempts decreases with time using deep Q-learning, as nodes
are gradually learning to optimize the throughput.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed a deep reinforcement learning
approach that enables nodes to dynamically select their roles to
maximize the network performance while ensuring robustness
against jamming and eavesdropping attacks. Simulation results
demonstrate the robustness of the proposed jamming-aware
routing protocol and show that when throughput is prioritized,
the proposed deep reinforcement learning approach achieves a
three-fold increase in throughput, compared to a benchmark
policy that assumes that the nodes have prior fixed roles.
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